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Introduction 
 
Drawing on Science and Technology Studies (Hinchliffe 1996), geographers researching 
technologies are increasingly interested in examining the place-based specificities of how 
technologies are encountered and used (Dixon and Whitehead 2008), and in how inserting a 
technology into sets of relationships (including human-nonhuman relationships) transforms those 
relationships in complex and sometimes unexpected ways (e.g., Holloway et al. 2013). In this 
paper we focus on the renegotiation of human-bovine agricultural ethical relationships in dairy 
farming, following a move to the use of robotic or automatic milking systems (AMS). Because 
robotic milking involves the replacement of ‘conventional’ twice-a-day milking managed by 
people with a system that supposedly allows cows the freedom to be milked whenever they 
choose, some people claim that AMS improves cows’ health and welfare, increases productivity, 
and has lifestyle advantages for farmers (e.g., de Koning 2011). Such claims are contested, but 
the installation of AMS clearly establishes new forms of relationships between cows, 
technologies, and farmers. The basis of this paper is that established, if not uncontroversial, 
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ethical relations on dairy farms are unsettled by the intervention of a radically different 
technology such as AMS, and that the renegotiation of ethical relationships is an important 
dimension of how the actors involved are re-assembled around a new technology. 
 We draw on the results of in-depth research on UK dairy farms. The research included 
interviews with 24 farmers and detailed on-farm observational research on three farms including 
video recording of human-animal-technology relations. To allow comparison, we included 
farmers using conventional milking technologies as well as those using robots. Twelve farmers 
using AMS, still a relatively small proportion of UK dairy farmers, were identified by 
approaching representatives of three AMS manufacturers for interview, and asking them to 
suggest farmer customers whom we could talk to. This approach was successful in producing a 
diverse sample of farms and farmers. We asked each AMS farmer interviewed to suggest a 
neighboring farmer using conventional milking technology. The logic was to interview 
conventional farmers who had some knowledge of AMS via seeing and discussing it on 
neighboring farms. They would thus be in an informed position and able to make comparisons 
between technologies. The three farms used for detailed observational research were drawn from 
the sample of AMS users. One was an established AMS farm, the second was an agricultural 
college farm that had robotic and conventional dairies side by side and was thus interesting for 
comparison, and the third was a farm in the process of converting from conventional to AMS 
technology. Drawing on these interviews and observational studies, we aim to explore ethical 
relations emerging on farms that have installed or are installing AMS, focusing on the 
contingent, contested nature of human-animal-technology interactions.  
 We argue for an approach that regards ethical relations as situated and emergent (Lynn 
1998), showing that as the identities, roles, and subjectivities of humans and animals are 
unsettled through the intervention of a new technology, ethical relations also shift. In such 
conditions, grounded empirical research can begin to map out the emergence and negotiation of 
new human-animal-technology relationships. We do not claim that the adoption of AMS causes 
changes in ethical relations, or that as a result of adoption the same ethical relations develop on 
all farms with AMS. Because farms and farmers differ widely, even in those cases where the 
decision has been made to covert to AMS, there are still differences in ethical relationships and 
in farmers’ attitudes towards technologies, cows, and the practices of dairy farming. 
Nevertheless, farmers adopting AMS have in common that a decision was made to use this 
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technology, and we argue that, while recognizing difference and specificity, it is still possible to 
make valid general points about the implications of AMS for human-cow relations and dairy 
farm situated ethics. 
 There is a long history of farmed animals being affected by changes in agricultural 
technologies and farming practices, and thus to an extent AMS is just one further example of a 
technological intervention that affects agricultural human-animal relations and the situated ethics 
of livestock farming (see, e.g., Coppin 2003; Franklin 1999; Holloway and Morris 2008; 
Holloway et al. 2011; Woods 2012). However, some of the particular characteristics of this 
technology, and its particular implications for human-animal relations, make it worthy of 
sustained analysis and allow the paper to make a novel contribution to debates about agricultural 
ethics. More detail on the characteristics of AMS is provided below, but we note two key points 
here. First, AMS is novel in claiming to empower cows and to allow them freedom and choice. It 
thus works with a notion of bovine subjectivity. We argue that this is in practice problematic, but 
the fact that it is a central part of the discursive framing of AMS is crucial. Second, and more 
widely, AMS exemplifies a recent technological trend in livestock agriculture towards 
automation and the intensified use of computer and information technologies. These are not 
unique to dairy farming and neither is the use of computers new, yet AMS represents a moment 
in which the combined use of these technologies is producing a change in what some AMS 
manufacturers are calling the ‘philosophy’ of farming, enabling concepts such as the 
‘management by exception’ of individuals rather than groups of animals (Holloway et al. 2013).  
 First, we introduce AMS in more detail. Second, recognizing the co-evolution of 
technologies and ethics in agricultural situations (Heutinck and Driessen 2007), we outline our 
theoretical perspective on exploring situated ethics. Third, we examine our empirical material 
from two different perspectives as a means of drawing out a detailed understanding of the 
renegotiation of situated ethical relationships in robotic dairy farming. From the first perspective, 
we cut across our research on sets of conventional and AMS dairy farms to discuss some of the 
ethical themes that emerged, and in particular focus on some of the practical ethical dilemmas 
negotiated in shifting from conventional milking to AMS. Here, we attempt to represent the 
views of the 24 dairy farmers interviewed, and to take into account the perspectives of AMS 
manufacturers. From the second perspective, we explore two more detailed farm studies, taking 
one conventional and one AMS dairy farm to produce detailed accounts of the renegotiation of 
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situated human-animal-technology relationships. In both empirical sections we draw on 
interviewees’ comments concerning human-cow-technology relations in dairy farming, 
interpreting these in terms of the negotiation of situated ethics and the emergence of ethical 
subjectivity. The paper ends with conclusions that discuss the value of the situated ethical 
perspective developed by the paper and emphasize the ethically transformative effects of 
technological interventions into human-nonhuman relationships in agriculture.  
 
 
Robotic or automatic milking systems 
 
Several social scientific investigations have begun to explore AMS as a technological 
intervention into the lives of dairy cows and farmers (e.g., Butler et al. 2012; Holloway 2007; 
Holloway et al. 2013; Porcher 2006; Porcher and Schmitt 2012; Stuart et al. 2013). AMS assign 
new roles to both cows and farmers. Cows are expected to voluntarily and regularly attend for 
milking, while farmers are expected to respond to data collected by the AMS and to input their 
‘stockmanship’ to cow management and welfare. AMS have six main components (Hogeveen et 
al. 2001). These include the milking stall, teat detection system, robotic arm that attaches the 
cups to the teats, teat cleaning system, electronic monitoring and recording system, and milking 
machine. Competing manufacturers configure these elements in different ways—e.g., deploying 
different teat detection technologies—but in essence all AMS work in similar ways. The system 
relies on cows attending to be milked individually, in contrast to conventional systems in which 
cows are brought into a milking parlor as a herd and milked in batches. As cows can sometimes 
be reluctant to attend for milking, various strategies are used to encourage them (see Holloway et 
al. 2013). However, many systems allow so-called ‘free cow traffic’ and do rely on cows 
voluntarily visiting the robot several times a day.  
 Cows are identifiable to the AMS via individual radio tags. The robot distributes 
individualized feed rations during milking and collects a complex array of data about each cow’s 
milk yield, milk composition, and indicators related to health. Farmers are alerted to issues such 
as health problems, system breakdowns, or particular cows not having been milked, and the 
system is highly dependent on high standards of stockmanship and an ability to understand and 
use the AMS data, despite the frequent representation of AMS as a technology that can relieve 
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farmers of much of the work associated with dairy farming (Butler et al. 2012; Owen 2003; 
Seabrook 1992; Spahr and Maltz 1997). 
 Manufacturers claim that AMS benefit cow health and welfare, can increase milk yields 
through more frequent milking, and reduce labor demand. AMS ideally releases farmers from the 
twice or three times daily routine of milking, allowing them to perform other work or have more 
leisure time. For cows, arguments for improved ‘freedom’ and quality of life are also made (e.g., 
Lely n.d.). AMS are seen as according cows choice about when to be milked, thus reducing the 
need for cows to be driven as a herd, which many experience as stressful. These claims, as 
incontrovertible outcomes of introducing AMS, are contested. Nuanced reviews (e.g., Jacobs and 
Siegford, 2012) of the wealth of contradictory agricultural science research findings (see, e.g., 
Hogeveen and Meijering 2000; Meijering et al. 2004) point to the complexities of assessing the 
benefits and problems associated with AMS, and to how the specific conditions of individual 
farms, and the characteristics of individual farmers, are likely to contribute to the success of the 
technology.  
 AMS is still relatively unusual in UK and North American dairy farming, but has become 
popular in Northern Europe and is increasingly regarded as an option for UK dairy farmers 
considering investment in new milking equipment. At the European scale, recent research 
reported from a European Dairy Farmers Benchmark Survey suggests that AMS will become a 
significant component in dairy farming, with the proportion of cows being milked by AMS 
increasing from 9 percent at present to an estimated 18 percent in 2016 (Pugh 2011). The 
adoption of AMS is driven by a number of factors (Butler et al. 2012; Holloway et al. 2013). 
First, many dairy farmers report difficulties in recruiting suitable workers to carry out milking. 
Labor is also relatively expensive and demands management time. AMS provides a substitute for 
labor, in particular providing a means for smaller-scale, one-person dairy farms to continue as 
viable businesses. Second, as suggested above, AMS is positioned by manufacturers within a 
context of rising industry and consumer concern for animal welfare. Although the concept of 
welfare, and AMS’s contribution to welfare, are both open to critique (as we show below), AMS 
draws very strongly on discourses of improving farm animal welfare as a way of legitimizing 
this radical technological intervention. Our examination of AMS as a technology that 
restructures the ethical relationships between humans and nonhuman animals is thus timely.  
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Human-animal relationships, situated ethics, and technological change 
 
Approaches to thinking about the ethics of human-animal relationships in agriculture have taken 
a number of forms. Much of this work is concerned with the objectification of animals in 
industrialized livestock farming (e.g., Franklin 1999; Franklin 2007; Emel and Wolch 1998; 
Noske 1997; Thierman 2010) and with the effects of this on how animals are treated. We briefly 
discuss animal welfare approaches and approaches associated with a wider ethics of care and 
response-ability, before outlining the notion of situated ethics. 
 
 
Animal welfare approaches 
 
Within agriculture and agricultural science, the ethics of livestock agriculture have tended to be 
framed around discourses of ‘animal welfare’, a concept critically analyzed by, among others, 
Buller and Morris (2003), Burton et al. (2012), Cole (2011) and Miele and Boch (2007). In 
agricultural science, research has centered around two areas. First, there are questions of how 
animals’ welfare can be measured and represented (Fraser 2003). Such assessments have 
included, for example, observations of animal behavior in different conditions that can be 
deemed to indicate either better or worse levels of welfare conditions. They have also included a 
focus on animals’ productivity, with the assumption being that if animals reproduce or gain 
weight, then welfare conditions must be acceptable. Second, and following from this, research 
has focused on trialing and comparing different farming systems, housing conditions, veterinary 
interventions, and so on, in efforts to ‘improve’ or ‘optimize’ animal welfare. Two further points 
concerning the animal welfare approach are relevant. First, the ethical ‘rightness’ of animal 
agriculture per se, and even of quite intensive forms of animal agriculture, tends not to be 
questioned (Twine 2007, 2010), and indeed can be seen to be bolstered where attention is paid to 
‘welfare’ (Cole 2011). Productivist animal agriculture is to a great extent accepted. What matters 
is assessing and improving ‘welfare’ within that agriculture. Second, there have been attempts 
associated with the welfarist approach to provide tools for assessing how ‘ethical’ particular 
farming systems are. For example, the ethical matrix developed by Mepham (2000; see Millar 
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2000 for case of robotic milking) is designed as a tool for bioethical analysis. It attempts to 
assess the health and welfare, autonomy, and social justice implications of a farming system for 
the different interest groups (including animals) involved. Although welfare-led approaches have 
had important effects on how animals are farmed, the limitations of such formal welfarist 
approaches to thinking about the ethics of livestock farming are summarized well by Twine 
(2007, 2010), who argues that they are confined by anthropocentric thought, in that “welfare 
ethics ... buttress the symbolic power of the human-animal hierarchy and are protective against 
more fundamental challenges to human-animal relations and patterns of consumption” (Twine 
2010, p. 24). Given this, this paper follows a different trajectory in thinking about how we might 
understand a situated, emergent ethics of human-animal relationships in farming. 
 
 
Ethics of care and response-ability 
 
In the social sciences, the ethics of farming animals has become caught up in wider discussions 
surrounding ethics of care and relational ethics, and with debates concerning how nonhuman 
animals should be taken into account in analyses of social relationships (Donovan and Adams 
2007). Rather than ethics being a distanced, normative realm, social relationships are seen as 
sites for the emergence of an ethics that emphasizes care and responsibility (McEwan and 
Goodman 2010). Referring to the feminist ethics of Popke (2006), and in contrast to the often 
atomized relationships assumed by normative ethical philosophy, McEwan and Goodman (2010, 
p. 103) argue for an “expanded, relational and collective vision of the social.” For those 
interested in the nonhuman as well as the human world, what counts as the social goes beyond 
the human to include nonhuman animals in their associative relations with people. The social is 
seen as co-produced by humans and nonhumans (Bingham 2006), and the complex ethical 
entanglements of humans and nonhumans within co-produced social situations have been 
increasingly studied (Panelli 2010). This perspective is inspired in part by actor network 
theorists, such as Latour (2006), with their focus on the relational emergence of agency within 
networks of diverse human and nonhuman entities, and in part by discussions of care, of taking 
responsibility in and for a more-than-human world, and of an ethics of companionship or sharing 
(e.g., Haraway 2008; Whatmore 1997, 2002). Broadly, understandings of ethical relationships 
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which emerge from these perspectives depart from a procedural, abstract, formal version of 
ethical philosophy, to think instead about how humans should be ‘response-able’ in diverse, 
sensitive, and practical ways to and for the needs of nonhuman others (Greenhough and Roe 
2010; Brown and Dilley 2012). As one example of how this response-ability perspective 
influences thinking about how we should engage in human-animal relationships, Fraser (2012) 
articulates several ethical principles that include an imperative to provide ‘good lives’ for 
animals in our care, to treat suffering with compassion, and to be mindful of possible unseen 
harms resulting from human action. Although each of these is complex and problematic, the 
crucial point here is that people should consistently pay attention to how their practices affect 
animals, and should accord animals moral considerability in their capacity to be affected by 
human activities.  
 
 
Situated ethics 
 
From a geographical perspective, a key corollary of these approaches to thinking about the ethics 
of human-animal relationships is that analysis should take into account their situatedness. The 
idea of situated ethical relationships is thus one way of beginning to explore a richer ethical 
terrain in livestock agriculture than that suggested by animal welfare approaches (Holloway 
2002; Lynn 1998; Whatmore 1997). Brandth (2006), for instance, emphasizes the embodied, 
caring, and emotional dimensions of working with farmed animals. Discussions of ethics of care 
demand a focus on the specificity and contingency, and hence the immanence, of always 
emplaced ethical relationships and embodied encounters. We should also pay attention to 
difference—between different species of animals, and between different animals of the same 
species, rather than maintaining a dualistic distinction between the human and the animal (Bear 
and Eden 2011; Lulka 2009; Wolfe 2013). Building on this conceptual acknowledgement of 
nonhuman difference, in this paper we additionally focus on technology to further emphasize the 
importance of taking into account nonliving alongside living entities. As such we are interested 
in exploring three-way relationships between humans, cows, and robotic technologies. 
Nonhuman as well as human differentiation is an essential aspect of the specific, situated ethical 
relationships to be explored, as our empirical focus on cows as a group and on differences 
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between cows, and on cows on different farms and in relationships with different humans and 
technologies, demonstrates. The concept of situated ethics suggests that it is possible to identify 
often implicit ethical positions specific to particular situations. As such, this approach to ethical 
relationships does not involve a normative concern with deciding what ought to be the case in 
any relationship, but instead focuses on describing what in practice actually is the case, even if 
the ethical relations described are shifting, contradictory, or problematic (Proctor 1998). 
Although ‘situatedness’ might imply fixity, we emphasize the fluidity or emergence of ethical 
relationships. Places and ‘situations’ change constantly; this change produces change in ethical 
relationships, but simultaneously changes in ethical relationship are part of the ongoing making 
of place and situation.  
 The empirical research we report on in this paper adds a further dimension to the 
attention paid to the ethics of human-animal relations in livestock farming by its focus on the 
three-way encounters between humans, cows, and milking technologies. Dairy farms are 
frequently restructured when AMS is introduced so that the micro-geographies of different 
spaces and flows around the farm are reorganized. A key part of the ethical dynamic of the 
situatedness focused on here is thus technological. We therefore attend to how emergent, situated 
ethical relations are bound up with particular spatial and technological relations governing the 
bodies and conduct of both humans and cows on robotic milking dairy farms. As Heutinck and 
Driessen (2007) put it, “the development of the AMS can be seen as part of a process of (the 
automation of) dairy farming in which ‘good farming’ is changing from caring for the animals, 
towards allowing the animals to take good care of themselves” (p. 253, emphasis in original). 
This has particular ethical implications for human-cow relations on dairy farms. Technological 
change is particularly important to our empirical example here, and requires a little further 
consideration.  
 Agricultural technologies are not ethically neutral, and new technologies pose new ethical 
problems because of how they intervene in and change existing relationships (Anthony 2012). In 
exploring the implications of AMS, we are thus particularly concerned with how the ethics of 
human-cow relations are contingent on the changing technological conditions of dairy farming. 
We look at how ethical relationships emerge in practice, focusing on the emergence of situated 
ethical relationships as new technologies intervene in and change established ethical relations. 
However, a technology is not simply a piece of equipment. As Wolfe (2013) argues, following 
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Heidegger (1977), a technology frames the world: it becomes a means of disclosing the world to 
us and of making it available in particular ways. Importantly, the process of technologically 
framing the world tends to be instrumentalist, reducing the world to a set of resources and cutting 
us off from other relationships with it (Wolfe 2013). This clearly resonates with the point made 
at the start of this section concerning the objectification of livestock, and indeed Anthony (2012) 
argues that contemporary agricultural technological systems focus on productive efficiency 
above all, simultaneously ‘disburdening’ us from more affective or caring relationships with 
farmed animals. Although we can point to studies that suggest the persistence of more complex 
and affective relationships with farmed animals (e.g., Brandth 2006; Convery et al. 2005; 
Holloway 2001; Wilkie 2010), it is doubtless the case that at a systemic level a technological 
framing that instrumentalizes animals pertains (Rollin 1995). Anthony aims to counter such a 
framing by positing instead what he refers to as an Environmental Virtue Ethic of Care (EVEC), 
which we might see as an attempt to deliberately ethically ‘re-burden’ ourselves. In farming 
animals, for Anthony (2012), we should be attentive, responsible, competent, and responsive. 
However, we differ from Anthony’s position in that he allocates responsibility as “caretakers” 
for implementing an EVEC to “industry technocrats” (Anthony 2012) and to consumers who 
should demand that their food is produced more ‘care-fully’. Farmers themselves are given the 
more marginal role of “caregivers,” meting out care on behalf of consumers, policymakers, and 
business within particular farming situations. However, the assigned subordinate role of 
“caregivers” seems to us to too easily disburden farmers from the responsibility to be response-
able, and we argue instead that farmers, together with “industry technocrats” and consumers, are 
part of a network of actors who have a co-responsibility for caretaking. Returning to ideas of 
situated ethics, what remains important here is that for different actors within this network, 
human-animal ethical relationships and the negotiation of what caretaking means in particular 
circumstances, are situated, complex, and shifting. Driessen (2012), in his writing on how 
farmers’ situated ethical views and practices should be taken more seriously by social scientists, 
refers to this as a ‘mosaic of concerns’ surrounding farmers’ relationships with livestock. This 
metaphor creates a sense of sets of ethical fragments (e.g., moments of practice, decision 
making, or encounter) that can nevertheless cohere, if only temporarily, into recognizable 
patterns, which we might refer to as a situated ethics. Driessen (2012) effectively positions 
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farmers as caretakers too, while acknowledging the ethical entanglements and multiple ethical 
positions farmers get into in their relations with livestock.  
 Having outlined our theoretical perspective on human-animal-technology relationships in 
agriculture, we examine some aspects of the situated ethical relationships that emerge in 
particular farming contexts, positioning farmers as co-caretakers rather than simply as 
caregivers. In this empirical material, we describe ethical positionings and negotiations that are 
largely implicit, rather than conceptualized by respondents in overtly ethical terms. We look first 
at three themes that cover key issues emerging from the set of farms studied, and second at two 
comparative farm studies. The former section allows us to outline some of the situated ethical 
issues that have to be addressed on farms using AMS; the latter section explores in more depth 
the situated ethics of two sets of human-animal-technology relations.  
 
 
Stockmanship, animal welfare, and bovine subjectivity 
 
In this section we draw on the set of 24 dairy farmer interviews to look at how the ethics of 
human-animal relationships in AMS emerge around situated understandings of stockmanship, 
animal welfare, and bovine subjectivity. These situated ethics contrast with those that have co-
emerged with conventional milking parlors and the very different human-animal relationships 
they are associated with. As we were told by manufacturers, AMS require farmers to adopt a new 
philosophy of dairy farming. This implies the need to negotiate new ethical relationships around 
AMS in the ways discussed below. 
 
 
Stockmanship 
 
The concept of stockmanship1 is an important component of livestock farmers’ identities, and of 
the situated ethics of livestock farming. It relates to issues such as knowledge of animals, 
practical skills in their management, the fostering of their productive capacities, and an ability to 
                                                 
1 The gendered term ‘stockmanship’ is generally used by practitioners, although references to ‘stockwomen’ 
alongside ‘stockmen’ are not uncommon. 
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identify problems such as illness. Although stockmanship has positive connotations, it is not 
necessarily benign and can be associated with reductive perspectives on the appropriate 
relationship between farmer and animals. One farmer, for example, expressed a particular 
normative value as part of a situated ethical view of the animals on his farm. He referred to 
analyzing milking data to decide whether or not to cull a particular cow from the herd: 
 
And when you start analyzing things…she’s either in or she’s out. It’s abject, cold, and 
callous but it’s the way that it should be done and it’s the right way to manage cows. 
(Farmer A) 
 
 More widely, stockmanship is seen as an essential quality of the good (livestock) farmer, 
as a practical and experiential set of knowledges and skills. It relates to the notion of situated 
ethics in these ways: in the constitution of the ‘good farmer’, in the way that it allows farmers to 
manage their farms and animals effectively, and in its association with care. Use of AMS, 
however, can change understandings of what constitutes good stockmanship. In conventional 
milking, stockmanship can be seen as the knowledge and skills that come from prolonged 
contact with animals (particularly during milking in the parlor). For the robot user, stockmanship 
instead becomes associated with checking computers, interpreting data to determine problems, 
and responding to issues suggested by the data. The stockman/stockwoman thus potentially 
becomes more distanced from the cows, with the robot and computer acting as intermediaries. 
For some, this challenge to conventional notions of stockmanship is ethically problematic in that 
the cow becomes ‘hidden’ in the technology. This hiding is partly literal, in the sense that the 
cow becomes absorbed into the technology. A Dutch developer of AMS, referring to talks he 
gives to groups of farmers, said: 
 
But this is also an experience I have in one of the first presentations I give about 
automatic milking, then we talked about technology and how it works and at the end 
there was some guy at the back in the audience, he says “Mr. [name], do you see the 
cows between all that iron?” 
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 In addition, the hiding of cows is partly more figurative, with the suggestion that the 
‘reality’ of cows’ bodies and behaviors becomes invisible if farmers focus simply on robot-
generated data. A farmer who had experienced both conventional and robotic milking systems 
said: 
 
I don’t think you can ever replace a human looking at an animal and seeing she’s bright, 
alert, you know cudding, all things like that. A robot will pick up milk drop or mastitis in 
the milk…it can’t sort of look at the general health of a cow. (Farmer B) 
 
There is a tension apparent here which becomes expressed in the emergence of different sets of 
situated ethics on different farms. As one farmer using conventional technology said: 
 
I heard a lot of farmers say that when they get a robot they spent more time with the 
cows, they still spend the same amount of time working with the cows as they did before 
and I think that’s madness! Why would you automate a job just to stand in the cowshed? 
But you see some people are like that. They’re mad on cows, which I’m not you see. 
(Farmer C) 
 
 For some, the time spent not milking should be used observing and managing cows in a 
qualitatively different, and better, way than was possible during conventional milking. For 
others, that time was better used doing other work or having more leisure time while the cows, 
effectively, managed themselves.  
 
 
Welfare 
 
The situated ethics of cow welfare were expressed in relation to several issues, including the 
differences between conventional milking and AMS on cows’ health and their ‘freedom’ to 
express behaviors. As an example, we consider the issue of grazing, and how a shift to 
continuous housing, with cows living in barns all year with feed brought to them, is legitimized 
by farmers as part of an emergent situated ethics of AMS dairying.  
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 There is acknowledgment that grazing cows contribute to a positive public perception of 
dairy farming, and for some there is a feeling that grazing is normatively the ‘right’ thing for 
cows’ welfare. As such, continuous housing is ethically problematic. However for those who 
house their cows all year with no or very little access to grazing, an ethical case can be made for 
continual housing from the particular situations farmers occupy.  
 On the one hand, justification can be provided from a practical, managerial perspective. 
An alternative, ethically weighted justification is to represent cows as better off inside, because it 
removes them from exposure to adverse weather and because the ability to control the 
environment and consistently provide sufficient food improves cows’ welfare, quality of life, 
and, to the benefit of the farmer, productivity. The following comment was made by a farmer 
who regularly hosted visits from people interested in observing the management of an AMS 
dairy:  
 
[To] all these visitors we’ve been selling our image across that you’ve got a cow that’s 
got an environment where she’s happy…we’re providing them with feed all the time. Do 
they want to go and see the cows on a howling day of wind like it is today and rain, 
standing in the corner of a field with their backs to the wind, do they want to see that, 
when they don’t get enough dry matter intake, when they’re wading in gutters and they’re 
lame? … I don’t have an issue with cows being in all the time…because our welfare 
standards are high. It’s in our interests to have a happy, healthy cow. If we don’t have 
that we might as well just quit now. (Farmer D) 
 
 This emergent situated ethical position reconciles a particular sense of cow welfare that 
emphasizes the comfort, security, and consistency of indoor conditions with meeting commercial 
needs for productivity. The grazing issue is returned to in our detailed farm studies. 
 
 
Bovine subjectivity 
 
An emergent if implicit understanding of bovine subjectivity is key to the situated ethics of AMS 
dairying. Promoted by AMS manufacturers, the shift from conventional to automated milking is 
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associated with a shift from the view that farmers have to intensively manage their cows, to a 
perspective that puts the onus on cows to care for themselves. AMS is thus marked by a 
redistribution of responsibility within human-cow relationships. This can be seen in changes in 
how farmers were response-able to their cows. Many comments were made, for example, that 
cows were happier and calmer in AMS dairying than in conventional milking herds, and this was 
put down to a reduced need for herding, cows’ ability to choose when to be milked, and a 
reduction in ‘herd-like’ behavior which was associated with bullying. Some interviewees said 
that since beginning AMS milking, they tried to disturb their cows as little as possible, as their 
mindset had changed from wanting to control production to providing for the cows so they can 
achieve their ‘natural’ potential. As one said: 
 
I find that the less you can be in the shed actually messing with the cows the better things 
seem to go…they don’t like being handled much…they like to be on their own and travel 
through the robot themselves. (Farmer E) 
 
This implies an important, ethically weighted change in perspective on cows’ assigned roles, 
subjectivities, and responsibilities. In contrast, one interviewee marked a different shift in cow 
behaviors related to the fact that, quite unusual for AMS dairying, his were allowed out to graze. 
His description of their behavior implies an alternative shift in bovine subjectivity (his adult 
cows behaved like young heifers) and in human-cow relationship: 
 
When you go with the motorbike and round them up they come running up, skipping, 
bucking, it’s like you’re rounding young stock up…which we’d never seen cows do 
before because whenever you went to round them up they were all busting with milk, 
uncomfortable, whereas now you would be rounding cows up that had only been milked 
an hour before. So yeah, it was a pleasure to fetch the cows in. (Farmer F) 
 
However, shifts in representations of changing bovine subjectivity can be given a different 
ethical slant. When cows are made responsible for attending the robot for milking, those who do 
not face sanctions. The comment below was made by the farmer we last cited, pointing to the 
complexity of the situated ethical positions that are negotiated in specific conditions:  
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There’s probably another five or six cows that we’ve sold because mentally they couldn’t 
take it. [The cows have to] make their mind up when they’re going to go and get milked 
which is a bit like us going to work…. Well, we felt there were five cows that we could 
have spent the next two years trying to train but they just wouldn’t…they just didn’t like 
the fact of having to go and milk themselves. (Farmer F) 
 
 From this ethical perspective, the attribution of freedom, choice, and responsibility to 
cows has become associated with behavioral expectations and the attribution of certain qualities 
to ‘problem’ cows. We see this in the farm studies below where cows can be labeled ‘lazy’ for 
not coordinating their behaviors with the demands of the robot and the farm business.  
 
 
Farm studies: from conventional to robotic milking 
 
The preceding section outlined some aspects of the ethical relations being renegotiated on dairy 
farms using AMS. To more fully explore the emergence of situated ethical relationships, 
however, it is necessary to examine the emplaced interplay of the different aspects on specific 
farms. To this end, we discuss two farm studies, both in Yorkshire, UK. Both farms also 
participated in the set of interviews referred to above. The first farm uses conventional milking 
technology and the second farm uses AMS. We use the farm studies to explore in more depth the 
situated ethical relationships and subjectivities emerging in different technological contexts, and 
to show how they are part of the ongoing constitution of place. 
 
 
Conventional milking in North Yorkshire 
 
David (a pseudonym) farms on the North Yorkshire coast, milking around 300 cows in a 
conventional milking parlor. He is the fourth generation of his family to work as a dairy farmer. 
The farm uses very little automatic or computerized dairy technology. The aim of the parlor is to 
get through the milking as quickly as possible so the cows can go back to producing more milk. 
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The parlor is “just to get milk out of a cow as fast as possible so they’re either back in the field 
eating grass, or sitting in the grass, or in the shed, or eating silage.” Partly, this reflects a concern 
for the cows’ welfare, as it is not beneficial for them to be standing on hard surfaces for long 
periods of time. But it is also led by a belief that the cows are on the farm to be “useful”: 
 
My main aim is not to have cows [standing] more than two hours waiting to be 
milked on concrete because they’re just [standing] there waiting. They aren’t 
[sitting] down making milk; they aren’t eating to make milk. They’re just 
[standing]. There are a lot of farms with eighty cows; the cows are [standing] for 
three hours. And…that’s three hours of the day [standing] on their feet not doing 
anything useful, so they’re in and away, or they’re laid down, or into the field. 
 
 This comment expresses part of David’s ethical position on human-cow relationships; 
cows have a use or productivity value. This objectifying ethical identification of cows is an 
important part of the situated ethical relationships on this dairy farm (and, presumably, most 
others), legitimizing the discipline and exploitation of cows’ bodily capacities. One of the main 
reasons for avoiding robotic milking machines and sticking with an ‘old fashioned’ parlor is 
David’s belief that a good stockman knows his animals by looking at them. The time spent in the 
milking parlor is time to look at the cows, get to know their individual traits and preferences, and 
consequently be able to spot problems. In contrast, he argues, AMS users spend too much time 
looking at computers and lose traditional skills such as judging cows’ health by looking at their 
bodies and behaviors. Part of David’s ethics of good farming is thus observation of individual 
cows, dependent on the close proximity necessitated by conventional milking practices.  
 
Like this big parlor we put in it was a monster you know…. [People said] “oh 
you’re stupid, you’ll never look after all that number of cows!” Yeah but we aren’t 
tinkering on looking at a screen saying oh she’s given this much milk! She’s had 
this much feed! She’s this temperature…if the cow’s not well she’s out of sync 
when she’s coming in to milk2. If she’s a front cow she comes in at the back. And if 
she’s a back cow she comes in at the front. So you know…and then there’ll either 
                                                 
2 This refers to the way that cows will tend to go through the milking process in the same order each day. 
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be no milk in the [udder] or it’s a bit slack and you think there’s something wrong 
here. 
 
When you’re milking, you know your cows, and you know their temperament…and 
if they’re out of character we have a pen at the end of the parlor. We segregate 
them out, they might be just bulling3, they might be just in season, but we segregate 
them out and then we can just check their temperature. But…if everything’s 
flowing alright which is…nine times out of ten, they’re milked, and they’re back in 
the field. You aren’t [standing] looking at a [computer] because it’s there, you’re 
going to look at it and start to press buttons and it will tell you the butter fat and all 
sorts now. I don’t want to know that!  
 
 Staring at a computer screen, associated with AMS, is thus represented as disrupting the 
‘rightness’ of proximal human-cow relationships. The observational skills described here 
contribute to an ethical notion of stockmanship that involves caring for the animals by applying 
knowledge of what is best for their welfare. Stockmanship is very much part of an ethical 
subjectivity constructed in relation to the cows being farmed. David prides himself on being able 
to recognize every animal and has affectionate nicknames for them; he enjoys their idiosyncratic 
behavior and the differences he observes between breeds. He is also determined not to put his 
own lifestyle choices ahead of cow welfare.  
 Such attitudes suggest the existence of an additional layer to the situated ethical 
relationships established on the farm, contrasting with the earlier comment emphasizing cows’ 
use value. This ‘alternative’ ethic suggests that there is, simultaneously, a relation of care based 
on a ‘closer’ and more sympathetic understanding of cows tied to particular farming knowledges 
and practices. The emergence of the situated ethics of a farm thus tends to center on attempts to 
negotiate resolutions to ethical tensions, for example between the commercial needs and the 
comfort and well-being of cows. Talking about automatic manure scrapers—almost universally 
installed alongside robotic milking machines because of the difficulty of moving cows to use a 
tractor or hand-operated scraper—David argues that they are a convenient tool for the farmer but 
at the expense of the comfort and well-being of the cows:  
                                                 
3 Bulling is displaying behavior associated with readiness for mating. 
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Automatic scrapers, yeah they’re fine, [but] what do you do when it breaks down on 
Christmas Day and you can’t even scrape them out? So they’re up to their neck in muck, 
a cow goes down because she’s bulling and she’s slipped and hurt herself. She’s getting 
harassed by the scraper, um…no! [Laughter] It’s ten minutes at each end of the day to do 
the shed, scraping out, job done! 
 
 As well as the resolution of ethical tensions on individual farms, the negotiation of 
situated ethics might also refer to sets of ‘external’ conditions affecting dairy farming. For 
example, David’s care for his cows is tempered with concern that some trends in the sector may 
be actively harmful to the animals. The desire for ever increasing production levels—as reflected 
in David’s desire to have cows out and eating soon after milking—has led to intensive breeding 
that is detrimental to the health of the cows. Like other farmers, David expressed ambivalent 
feelings about his attempts to breed a more productive herd:  
 
They’ve been bred for the milk…frightening what they do really…. If anybody 
wanted to be jumping on the welfare they’d be jumping on Holsteins. They’ve 
pushed the breed; it’s like us doing twenty hours a day, that’s the problem. Fertility 
has dropped, their feet are like cheese…mature cheddar is harder to cut than a 
Holstein’s foot, they’re white, they’re soft. 
 
 Farmers like David are caught between feeling that they know what is best for their cows, 
and persistent doubts that some of their (particularly financially driven) decisions about the 
management of the herd are undermining care. Such examples demonstrate the ambiguity and 
complexity of a situated ethics which can embody conflicting ethical positions as well as 
tensions between a desire to farm ‘ethically’ and circumstances that make ‘ethical’ farming 
difficult.  
 Indeed, similar fears were discussed by other farmers who send their cows out to graze, 
but worry that they are doing it for personal, intuitive reasons, rather than because it is best for 
the cows. They like to see cows in fields and know the value of this to public perceptions of 
dairy farming, but know that the ‘modern’ dairy cow cannot necessarily meet her nutritional 
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needs from grass alone. This reflects a rather different ethical tension that is important to the 
negotiation of the situated ethics of this farm. This is a tension not simply between production 
and welfare, as seen earlier, but between the acknowledgment of an almost aesthetic ethical 
sensibility concerning what is appropriate for cows (they should graze) and a knowledge that 
because humans have bred cows with particular nutritional needs then grazing is actually 
insufficient. This situated ethical tension is quite complex. In David’s comments, the 
insufficiency of grazing was balanced against welfare concerns (cows should graze even if 
grazing is insufficient for meeting the productivity demands of the farm). However, breeding 
with a particular objective (high milk yields) has proceeded regardless of the knowledge that this 
would produce cows that could not subsist by grazing (as such, cows cannot just graze even if 
they should, because of other human interventions in their lives). Such breeding practices have 
thus produced a secondary ethical concern on top of the primary ethical dilemma concerning 
how to negotiate the twin aims of productivity and welfare. There are thus several layers of 
ethical problematization surrounding these interconnected issues of breeding and feeding cows 
as animals that are supposed to be productive units and experience high levels of welfare, itself a 
many layered and problematic term. 
 
 
Robotic milking in East Yorkshire 
 
Our second farm study focuses on a farm in East Yorkshire with 120 pedigree Holsteins. Simon 
(a pseudonym) is the third generation to work on the farm, and took over management of the 
herd after returning from agricultural college. Problems with staff and a general labor shortage in 
the agricultural sector prompted Simon to buy robots in 2006. This involved completely 
remodeling the farm to include a barn with the robots in which cows are housed year-round. 
Here, we discuss the renegotiation of the farm’s situated ethical relationships following the 
introduction of robots. 
 The introduction of AMS is linked to the establishment of new human and bovine ethical 
identities, which re-articulate what it is to care for cows, in part by suggesting that cows can be 
given a freedom (or perhaps a responsibility) to care for themselves. AMS users frequently 
contend that cows know best how to meet their own needs, and consequently the role of the 
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farmer should be to provide for those needs—through creating the right environment, providing 
ample food and milking opportunities, and so on—rather than dictating to the cows how often 
they should eat, be milked, etc. This relates to beliefs that cows have ‘natural’ behaviors that are 
suppressed in conventional systems. Ethically, allowing cows to express such ‘natural’ behavior 
is unproblematically represented by AMS manufacturers and many farmers as a good thing and a 
good reason for switching to robots. Comparisons are drawn between how a cow would rear a 
calf—with the calf suckling milk throughout the day—and the twice-a-day milking system that is 
designed for the convenience of the farmer but which puts strain on the cows’ udders. Robotic 
milking is seen as a solution to this problem by allowing milking when cows choose. As Simon 
explains, he chose a ‘free access’ system because ‘forced traffic’ methods of directing the cows 
through one-way gates to ensure they are milked regularly runs counter to his ethos of 
encouraging cows’ self-expression: 
 
I don’t think that’s a very good way of…letting cows express themselves really, it’s 
forcing cows to do something…you may as well go back to milking cows in a parlor 
because you’re forcing them to go into an area and then they’re having to go through…so 
that’s their way of doing it.  
 
 For Simon, the benefits of robotic milking are evident in the changed behavior of the 
cows, who he says are happier and more content when left to their own devices and able to 
manage their own lives. The situated ethical relationships that emerge on this farm focus on a re-
identification of cows as living independently of much of the human intervention they would 
experience on conventional dairy farms. The emergent ethical relationship here implies a 
reduction of the direct human-cow interaction that was, conversely, so important to the situated 
ethics of the first farm study. For Simon, quiet and productive cows are an indication that they 
are being well cared for and that they are beginning to lose any association between human 
contact and stressful milking or herding situations: 
 
From day one they were just quieter, just chilled out and happy. You’re not forcing them 
to do anything that they don’t want to do. If I’d have gone into a shed…before the robots 
with cows in [it] with a crush the cows would have been running around the shed all over 
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the place, running around, coming up knocking around all the equipment. If you’d have 
been walking into it, standing at the gate, there would have been half a dozen cows 
running up and down. They’re just so quiet. I’ve had study tours of people, thirty or forty 
people in the shed, and the cows haven’t batted an eyelid… which before that would 
never have happened just because you’re not herding them around. They’re individuals 
not a herd anymore. That’s the difference of milking in this system. 
 
Despite this belief that cows should have freedom to express themselves, there is a tension 
between trying to allow this while maintaining the levels of production and efficiency needed to 
run a profitable farm. Conflict emerges between the ideals of cow freedom and the reality of 
needing to maintain a degree of control over cows’ behavior. The situated ethics of the robotic 
dairy farm thus tend to embody a contradiction between an ethic of bovine autonomy and a 
requirement for agricultural productivity. Talking about the design of the shed, Simon explained 
that the most successful designs encourage cows to move between eating, ruminating, and 
milking smoothly and consistently:  
 
Just to get the cows to go around in circles, basically that’s all you want. So they’ll get up 
and go to the robot, they’ll go and eat, they’ll have a drink, go and lay down, they’ll go to 
the robot, they’ll go and eat, go and lay down, that’s all you want them to do. 
 
This is perhaps at odds with the notion that robotic milking should mean allowing the cows to do 
whatever they please, even though this might not mean engaging in ‘productive’ behavior. The 
ethical responsibility ascribed to the cows in this situated ethics in part prescribes an expectation 
that they will behave in certain ways concomitant with productivity (i.e., that they will ‘care for 
themselves’ by eating appropriately and regularly attending the robot). One of the most fraught 
areas for farmers using AMS is the question of whether to let their cows out to graze. For many 
farmers, until they buy robots the cows have gone out to grass, but switching to AMS 
necessitates keeping the cows housed all year-round because of the difficulty of ensuring that 
they regularly come in from the fields to be milked. For Simon, keeping the cows indoors is 
largely a matter of being able to control what they eat, and thereby increasing their productivity. 
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He acknowledges that it is partly for his own convenience, to save the trouble of bringing cows 
in from the field if they have not been milked:  
 
People like to see [grazing] but I don’t think there’s any need for it and I can’t control 
what a cow eats so I can’t control my inputs and outputs. Whereas if I’ve got them inside 
they’re on the same diet everyday and I know exactly what they’re doing and I don’t get 
any stomach upsets and the cows are the same everyday whether its summer, winter, 
whatever, which for me is better. Also out at grass I would have to go and fetch them in, 
fetch the other cows that didn’t milk, which I haven’t got time to do. 
 
Simon here emphasizes the additional control given by keeping cows inside, a control which 
reduces interruptions and irregularities in the productiveness of their bodies. This perspective has 
the ethical effect of a reductive representation of cows as entities that consume inputs and 
produce outputs, both of which have to be carefully controlled. In this sense, then, cows do not 
necessarily know how best to care for themselves in this regime, as the farmer feels it is 
necessary to closely control what they eat, rather than allowing the cows to choose when and 
what to consume. Likewise, the act of fetching cows when they have not been milked as often as 
the farmer would like runs contrary to the rhetoric of bovine free choice. 
 Simon explains this by arguing that certain cows are lazy. While they do ‘know’ that they 
should be milked they choose not to because they would rather continue lying in the cubicles. 
The farmer has to re-assume responsibility for these animals because otherwise they will at best 
be less productive than required, and at worst suffer health problems as a result of their refusal to 
be milked: 
 
There are two cows that won’t go through; if you left them they’d just lay there and not 
do anything. They’re just lazy! They’re not lame, there’s nothing wrong with them, 
they’re giving plenty of milk but they’re just lazy…. They just lay there and let it drip 
out. They just won’t go through without you putting them in. 
 
 There is thus an alternative dimension to the ethical subjectivity ascribed to cows 
expressed in this comment, involving an anthropomorphic, moral judgment concerning the 
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behavior of some, contrasting them unfavorably with the productive, appropriate behavior of 
others. In these cases, the ethical relationship between humans and cows has to be renegotiated. 
The situated ethical relationships between humans and cows on robotic farms can be 
differentiated according to the ethical subjectivity accorded to individual cows (e.g., as either 
productive or lazy). Some farmers take this idea to its extreme and cull certain cows in the belief 
that they will never be able to thrive in the robotic system4. They want to give the cows 
‘freedom’ but recognize that in practice there are some that simply refuse to take this opportunity 
for autonomy and must instead be herded and monitored in order to fit the farmer’s expectation 
of the behavior of a productive dairy cow. A technology associated with what has become an 
ethical position centered on bovine ‘freedom’ thus produces fresh ethical problems in those cases 
where cows ‘resist’ actively playing out the productive roles ascribed to them, and do not 
internalize the ascribed responsibilities that come with being part of a robotic milking dairy herd. 
The ethical subjectivity of the cows as autonomous entities conflicts with the need for them to be 
at the same time productive units, such that there is a need for re-establishing new modes of 
discipline and ways of differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cows in this particular system.  
 This second farm study has focused on a farm that has adopted AMS and explored how 
the situated ethics of this farm contrasts in some ways with that of the farm using conventional 
milking technology. The different ethical subjectivities of the cows and humans in these systems 
are associated with different (ethical) human-cow relationships. The intervention of robotic 
technology to some extent disrupts established human-cow ethical relationships and ethical 
identities, forcing the renegotiation of these on-farm situated ethical positions, which 
redistributes expectations and responsibilities in ways that also produce new ethical tensions and 
ambiguities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                 
4 At the same time, some breeding companies supplying dairy bull semen for artificial insemination are now 
starting to offer semen from bulls selected as likely to father cows highly suited in body and temperament for 
robotic milking. See, for example, Semex’s promotion of ‘Robot Ready™‘ semen (Semex 2012).  
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A focus on situated ethics illustrates the complexity of the relational ethical negotiations being 
played out on particular farms. Although the ‘ethics’ under consideration may be implicit, and 
because the concept differs from approaches derived from conventional ethical philosophy, 
situated ethics is nevertheless central to thinking about how humans understand and treat other 
entities in specific, grounded situations. In the example studied in this paper, the negotiation of 
human-bovine ethical relationships associated with technology and technological change 
emphasizes the need to take into account multiple human and nonhuman (including nonliving) 
entities in examining the ongoing emergence of particular situated ethical relations. In these 
circumstances, the intervention of a technology, with its particular reframing of human-cow 
relationships, unsettles existing ethical relations, and they are not always easily re-settled; they 
are complex, with several layers, and are sometimes contradictory, as some of our examples 
show. Here, we are drawn to reflect on the way that all uses of animals in agriculture are, have 
been, and will continue to be ethically problematic and complex. Although we have focused on a 
particular new technology in this paper, it is evident that the particular nature of agricultural 
human-animal relationships and ethics has long been scrutinized from different conceptual 
perspectives. For some, for example, the subordinate legal status of farmed animals, as property 
or commodities, provides a focus for understanding the very limited ability of welfare law to 
seriously question how animals are treated in agriculture (Francione 2007). The limits of 
welfarist approaches, already mentioned in this paper, mean that their associated regulation of 
animal agriculture tends to actually support and justify continued animal commodification and 
exploitation in capitalist agriculture. From another perspective, Stuart et al. (2013) apply Marxist 
social theory to the “labor” performed by cows in dairy farming. Their approach allows them to 
explore the pertinence of the concept of cows’ “alienation” from their work, from their bodily 
products (milk and calves), and from their bovine natures, because they cannot associate in herds 
‘naturally’ comprised of a mix of male and female animals of different ages. Writing such as this 
indicates the importance of taking into account wider historical, geographical, social, cultural, 
and economic contexts in which the treatment of farmed animals, and the situated ethics of 
human-animal relations, are always unsettling. As such, we do not argue that a technology such 
as AMS causes more, or more difficult, ethical problems than conventional milking technologies 
(indeed, both are associated with problematic human-cow relationships). Instead we suggest that 
technological change produces a need for an ongoing negotiation of difficult, practical ethical 
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issues, within a social context in which farmed animals remain exploitable commodities. One 
way of viewing AMS is thus to see this technology as a means for re-articulating, or perhaps 
intensifying, the ‘use’ made of cows in dairy farming. On the one hand, as the paper emphasizes, 
AMS depends on the production of a bovine subjectivity that centers around cows managing, or 
‘caring’ for themselves (Holloway et al. 2013), by negotiating their own routines, regularly 
attending the robot to be milked, and so on. In this way, AMS is reliant on a reconstitution of 
cows’ daily behaviors: while this is represented as giving cows ‘freedom’, in practice 
requirements are placed on them by the robot which can be enforced by other technologies such 
as one-way gates, or by human intervention. On the other hand, and simultaneously, AMS 
collect, analyze, and represent more data on cows’ behaviors and productivity than is normally 
available. This permits individualized knowledges of cows to be available to farmers, creating 
opportunities for new types of intervention in cows’ lives and bodies.  
 Although the implications of AMS as a technological intervention in dairy farming can 
be described in these terms, the approach taken in the paper allows us to focus on, crucially, how 
the situated ethics of each farm will be different, specific, and variably negotiated. Myriad 
differences in (for example) farmers’ life histories and personal circumstances, particular farm 
microgeographies, the characteristics of the cows involved, farms’ business structures and their 
relations with markets and prevailing agricultural policy regimes, will be implicated in situated 
ethical relationships, and because all of these ‘factors’ are in flux, the (re)constitution of ethical 
relationships must also be ongoing. As just one example of what this means, the ability of AMS 
to collect and represent great amounts of data, which can potentially be analyzed and used by 
farmers, is taken advantage of to highly variable degrees. For some, intensive use of the data has 
become key to their farming practices. For others, they are either unaware of what data is 
available, or unwilling or unable to fully engage with the data. In this way, there are some 
parallels with wide variations in farmers’ knowledges about other technologies they might be 
using (see, for example, the very different case presented by Stahlman and McCann 2012). 
Although it is possible to draw out some more general comments about the implications of 
technological change, it is clear that we cannot claim that technological change simply drives or 
necessitates changes in ethical relationships. As illustrated in our two farm studies, the specific 
emergent relational ethics in each situation will be particular to that place and human-animal-
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technology assemblage. At the same time, recursively, ethical relationships are part of the 
ongoing making of place and assemblage. 
 While acknowledging such difference, the paper illustrates how the insertion of a 
technology into a farming situation has important ethical effects, for example on the notion of 
care and farmers’ “mosaic of concerns” (Driessen 2012) relating to their cows and farms. AMS 
changes the corporeal relationships between humans and cows, and also effects change in 
farmers’ knowledges of and perspectives on their cows—what the cow is to the farmer becomes 
something different. Similarly, both cows and humans become subject to new expectations. 
These changing knowledges, perspectives, and expectations are associated with the technological 
change. Farmers, for example, are expected to care for their cows and demonstrate stockmanship 
and response-ability in new ways, mediated by the AMS. Cows, in turn, while also subject to 
discourses of freedom and choice, are expected to care for themselves, and to behave in ways 
that are demanded by and embedded into the design of the AMS (for example, by attending for 
milking at regular intervals). The AMS too is part of the network of entities involved in care for 
the cows. In this way, in automatic milking, cows can be understood to ‘become bovine’ in 
different ways, while ‘revealing themselves’ to the farmer in new technologically mediated ways 
as the AMS collects, stores, and presents complex data about their bodies, their productivity, and 
their milk. AMS thus redefines the notion of care in dairy farming, redistributing responsibilities 
and effecting ethical ‘reburdening’ within a network of human and nonhuman (including bovine 
and technological) entities.  
 Finally, although we have focused on the situated ethics of particular farms, it is 
important to avoid a myopic neglect in thinking about the constitution of human-nonhuman 
ethical relations, of how farms are positioned within wider networks of institutions. We allude to 
this above, in noting the importance of, for example, farms’ relationships with their markets and 
with agricultural policy. We need to see technologies, such as AMS, as bound up with discourses 
and practices of dairy farming that are systemic, influenced by policy makers and technological 
research and development, as Anthony (2012) suggests. On-farm situated ethics emerge in 
relation to such systemic discourses and practices, but give them specific inflections in particular 
circumstances. On this basis, further research into the situated ethics of human-animal-
technological relationships is required, particularly as automatic and information technologies 
become more deeply embedded into livestock agriculture. Research that pays attention to 
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different livestock species, in different farming situations in geographical locations, and 
associated with different automatic and information technologies, will be important in exploring 
the emergence of differently situated ethical relationships and in continuing to critically examine 
the problematics of negotiating different ethical positions in contemporary capitalist modes of 
agriculture. 
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